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Abstract 
 
In pursuit of its transition from a command to a market economy, Russia has witnessed 
enormous regional differences in economic growth rates.   Moreover, the implementation of 
economic reforms has also differed markedly across regions.  We analyze whether regional 
differences in reform policies can account for regional differences in growth rates, and conclude 
that to a considerable degree, they can.  Most notably, we find that regional differences in price 
liberalization policies exhibit a positive direct correspondence with growth.  We also find that 
regional differences in large-scale privatization exhibit a positive correspondence with the 
regional formation of new legal enterprises, which in turn exhibits a strong positive 
correspondence with growth.   
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In pursuit of its transition from a command to a market economy, Russia has experienced 
enormous regional differences in economic growth rates.  Over the period 1993:IV through 
1997:IV, the 48 regions in Russia in which the capital city comprises at least 30% of the total 
regional population had annual average growth rates in real per capita income ranging from –9.0 
to 15.7%.
1  Moreover, the implementation of economic reforms following the breakup of the 
Soviet Union has also differed markedly across regions.  For example, Magadan has aggressively 
pursued small- and large-enterprise privatization reforms, but has been slow to liberalize prices; 
the opposite is true in Moscow.  And while Saratov and Kaliningrad have aggressively 
implemented both privatization and price-liberalization reforms, Ulyanovsk and the secessionist 
Republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan have done neither.  
We analyze whether regional differences in the implementation of price-liberalization 
and privatization reform policies can account for regional differences in growth rates, and 
conclude that to a considerable degree, they can.  Specifically, we find that regional differences 
in price-liberalization policies exhibit a positive direct correspondence with growth.  We also 
find that regional differences in large-scale privatization reforms exhibit a positive 
correspondence with the regional formation of new legal enterprises, which in turn exhibits a 
strong positive correspondence with growth.   
Ongoing literatures focus on the implementation of price-liberalization and privatization 
reforms in transition economies.  Price liberalization is clearly important, since it enhances the 
efficiency with which resources are allocated, yet the speed at which liberalization reforms 
should be implemented is less clear (for a discussion of alternative viewpoints, see Roland, 2000, 
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Ch. 6, and references therein). For example, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue in favor 
of rapid implementation because gradual/partial implementation can create supply diversions that 
generate welfare losses. Alternatively, Lau, Qian and Roland (2000) show that gradual 
liberalization can also be effective in achieving transition, and note that China has experienced 
rapid growth in their transition even though they have only gradually liberalized prices. 
Privatization reforms are also generally viewed as important, since state ownership can 
lead to inefficiencies resulting from excess employment, asset stripping, and corruption (e.g., see 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).  However, Roland (2000) notes that managers of state-owned 
enterprises in transition economies have also succeeded in shedding excess labor and 
restructuring their operations to run more efficiently (Roland, 2000, Ch. 9, and references 
therein).  Moreover, Carlin et al. (2001) examine 3,300 firms in 25 transition countries, and find 
that ownership per se has no significant impact on firm performance. Efficiency issues aside, 
privatization reforms are also potentially important due to their potential impact on new 
enterprise formation, which as Kornai (1990), McMillan (1997) and Berkowitz and DeJong 
(2001) emphasize, is an important growth engine in transition economies.  For example, 
McMillan argues that by severing political connections from formerly state-owned enterprises, 
privatization can reduce or eliminate the incentive of local governments to use their tax and 
regulatory power against private enterprises in an effort to protect state-owned business interests.  
Privatization can thus potentially enhance regional private-business environments.   
In the case of Russia, it is useful to distinguish between small- and large-scale 
privatization reforms. Privatization began in 1993 when all state-owned firms were allocated to 
the property funds of the federal government, and governments located in the regions (these 
include the primary regional government and subordinate local governments in cities, 3 
 
settlements, etc.).  Local governments usually obtained control over small shops and stores 
operating predominately in trade and retail services; for the most part, these shops could be sold 
off for cash. The federal government obtained control over large enterprises in the 
manufacturing, communications, energy, and heavy industry sectors. With the varied cooperation 
of the regional governments in which these large enterprises were located, the federal 
government sold off ownership shares to insiders at a discount, and allowed limited groups of 
outside investors to buy ownership positions using vouchers (these were equity claims that the 
Russian federal government had issued just before privatizing). As with price-liberalization 
reforms, the extent of privatization activity has varied markedly across regions.   
The impact of Russia’s small- and large-scale privatization reforms on new enterprise 
formation is controversial. Boycko, Shlefier, and Vishny (1995) argue that revenues from small 
privatization provided an incentive for regional governments to support market-enhancing 
reforms, including the development of regulatory environments conducive to new enterprise 
formation. However, Friebel (1995) shows that there has been considerable insider self-dealing 
at the regional level in Russia: managers and well-connected members of the government often 
colluded either to gain control of privatized assets or to block local reform efforts. Black, 
Kraakman and Tarassova (2000) argue that large-scale privatization has led to insider self-
dealing, and has produced a business climate characterized by excessive and arbitrary taxation, 
official corruption, and ubiquitous organized crime.  However, large-scale privatization may 
have released a public demand for the enforcement of good regulations, because federally 
privatized enterprises are typically much larger than locally privatized firms, and therefore, more 
closely monitored by the public (Berkowitz and Holland, 2001). 4 
 
Given the importance of distinguishing between small- and large-scale privatization in 
the case of Russia, we measure both types of activity separately at the regional level.  As noted, 
we find that large-scale privatization exhibits a positive correspondence with the regional 
formation of new legal enterprises, which in turn exhibits a strong positive correspondence with 
growth.  In contrast, small-scale privatization exhibits a statistically and quantitatively weak 
correspondence with both growth and new enterprise formation, perhaps due in part to the 
insider self-dealing noted by Friebel (1995).   
Complementary to our intra-national analysis, several empirical studies on transition in 
the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe focus on international patterns of policy reforms 
and economic growth. For example, see de Melo and Gelb (1996); de Melo, Denizer and Gelb 
(1996); Fisher, Sahay and Gel (1996); Sachs, (1997); and Selowsky and Martin  (1997).  
 
 
2.   Data Description 
Our data set includes regional measures of income growth, new enterprise formation, 
initial conditions and policy reforms.  All eleven of Russia’s geographic territories have regions 
included in the data set.  There are 89 regions in Russia, including 21 republics, six krays, 49 
oblasts, one autonomous oblast, ten autonomous okrugs, and two federal cities (Moscow and St. 
Petersburg).  Ideally, we would work with data from all 89 regions.  However, our regional 
price-liberalization measure is reported only at the capital-city level, and thus is not necessarily 
representative of the region as a whole.  To minimize this problem, we limit our sample to 5 
 
regions in which the capital city comprises at least 30% of the total regional population.
2  There 
are 48 such regions in Russia; these regions, along with their geographic territories, are reported 
in Table 1. 
 
2a.  Growth and New Enterprise Formation 
We use real per capita income data to measure growth in regional standards of living 
(GROWTH).  Our measure of GROWTH is the annualized average growth rate between 
December of 1993 and 1997:IV of regional per capita money income, deflated by a regional-
level consumer price index (source: Goskomstat Rossii, 1993, 1994, 1995b, 1997, 1998). Our 
measure of new enterprise formation (NEWENT) is the number of small legally registered 
private enterprises per thousand inhabitants as of December 31, 1995 (source: Goskmostat 
Rossii, 1996).  This measure approximates the regional “stock” of private small enterprises at 
that date, since regional governments typically require their enterprises to register on an annual 
basis.  While employment ceilings that define small enterprises vary across industries, the typical 
small enterprise employs no more than 200 workers. These enterprises include privatized former 
state enterprises, spin-offs from privatized state enterprises, and startups.
  Legal startups and 
spin-offs began to appear in the Former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and rapidly expanded 
when Russia began instituting economic reforms in the early 1990s (Aslund, 1997). Thus, our 
NEWENT measure is intended to capture the accumulated regional “stock” of legal 
entrepreneurial activity. 
                                                   
2 Below the 30% cutoff, there are regions such as Vologda and Kemerovo in which capital cities 
have smaller populations than other cities in the region.  There are also regions such as the Sakha 
Republic that have low population densities and small urban sectors throughout the region.  In 
either case, capital-city data are likely to be relatively uninformative about the region as a whole. 6 
 
GROWTH and NEWENT are listed in Table 1, and plotted in Figure 1a (along with the 
fitted line obtained by regressing GROWTH on a constant and NEWENT).  A striking aspect of 
the figure is the wide range of growth experiences observed in our sample.  Also notable is the 
correspondence observed between regional growth and new enterprise formation.  The 
unconditional correlation between the series is 0.64, and the estimated regression coefficient 
implies that the addition of a single new small enterprise per thousand inhabitants corresponds 
with a 1.07 percentage-point increase in the regional annual growth rate (statistically significant 
at the 5-percent level).  Figure 1b plots growth against new enterprises for a sub-sample of our 
data set that excludes three potential outliers (Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the oil-rich Tyumen 
oblast).  These regions benefited from unusually high levels of new enterprise formation, and 
also enjoyed above-average growth.  Their exclusion reduces the unconditional correlation 
between the series to 0.3, but reduces the estimated regression coefficient only slightly, to 0.83 
(the coefficient remains significant at the 5-percent level).  We give special attention to these 
potential outliers in our empirical analysis, but our findings turn out not to be sensitive to their 
inclusion in the sample. 
 
2b. Policy reform 
We measure the extent of regional price liberalization (PRICE) using an official survey 
of a basket of 73 food goods that was conducted in capital cities in October 1995 (see European 
Union 1996). In the survey, each good was coded for its regulation type, including allocation by 
rationing and the issuance of coupon (most conservative); sales subject to price ceilings (medium 
regulation); prices subject to indirect controls such as subsidies and limits on price mark-ups 
(light regulation), and no price controls. The survey tallied points for the extent of price 7 
 
regulation on each product and ranks each region. We rank regions on a uniform unit scale from 
most regulated (1/48) to most liberal (1).  
We measure small-scale privatization (SPRIV) and large-scale privatization (LPRIV) 
within each region using the accumulated number firms privatized by local and federal 
governments during 1993–1995 per thousand inhabitants. These measures potentially overstate 
privatization because they do not account for privatized enterprises that were subsequently 
nationalized or bankrupted. Fortunately, there was very little bankruptcy and nationalization in 
Russia between 1993 and 1995. 
The final measure of regional policy reform we analyze is the share of the popular vote 
garnered by “pro-reform parties” in Russia’s December 1995 parliamentary elections (REF).  In 
this election, pro-reform parties stood for a continuation and deepening of microeconomic 
reforms, including price liberalization, privatization initiatives and protection of property rights. 
In contrast, non-reform parties called for a slowdown or even a reversal in price decontrol, 
privatization and property right protections (the category “pro-reform” is taken from Clem and 
Craumer, 2000).  Our use of this measure was inspired by Warner’s (1999) finding that regions 
that had implemented relatively widespread and deep microeconomic reforms prior to the 
election subsequently supported pro-reformist parties in the election.  Thus REF serves as a 
proxy variable used to capture reformist activity that we do not measure directly.  All four policy 
reform measures are listed in Appendix Table A1. 
2c. Initial conditions 
Our primary focus is on the relationship between growth, new enterprise formation and 
policy reform.  However, in order to control for the influence of other relevant factors, we also 
consider five regional initial conditions (also listed in Appendix Table A1).   8 
 
The first initial condition we consider is the share of the population fifteen years old and 
higher as of 1994 that received formal schooling beyond the high-school level (EDU), which is 
taken from the 1994 Russian micro-census (Goskomstat, 1995a).  Higher education is important 
in post-transition Russia, since workers and managers were expected to rapidly adjust to massive 
changes in market conditions.  
Second, we consider initial living standards (INTIAL), which we measure using the ratio 
of average money income per capita to the cost of a uniform basket of 19 basic food goods; the 
average was computed between December of 1993 and March of 1994.  Because food accounted 
for more than half of household expenditures during the 1990s (see Goskomstat 2000, p.167), 
INITIAL is a useful regional measure of per capita purchasing power. A positive (negative) 
correspondence between GROWTH and INITIAL indicates a divergence (convergence) in real 
income across regions. 
Third, we consider initial production potential (IO), which is measured using labor shares 
employed in the industrial sectors within each region in 1985 (this is taken from Gaddy, 1996).  
We multiplied these shares by the industry’s value added, net of labor costs (intermediate 
shadow-profit rate based on world-market prices and computed by Senik-Leygonie and Hughes, 
1992), and summed the resulting products to compute IO. IO is meant to characterize the basic 
industrial structure of the region prior to transition: a high value indicates the regional presence 
of relatively competitive industries (e.g., oil and gas production). It is not surprising that the oil 
and gas industries have the highest value added in the industrial sectors, while food processing 
has the lowest (indeed, negative) value added. Because an industrial structure that is competitive 
on world markets is advantageous under market conditions, we would expect a positive 
correspondence between IO and GROWTH. 9 
 
Fourth, we measure the regional importance of the defense industry (DEFENSE) prior to 
transition.  This measure is taken from Gaddy (1996); it is the number of workers employed in 
the defense industry per thousand employed workers in the region in 1985. Gaddy argues that the 
defense industry should have a positive impact on growth because it attracted highly skilled 
workers and gave regions strong political connections with major power brokers in Moscow.  
We expect DEFENSE to have a positive relationship with GROWTH, given the relative stability 
of this industry in an otherwise turbulent economic environment. 
Finally, we measure the natural log of the distance of each region from Moscow 
(LNDIST).  Moscow is the major source of financial and physical infrastructure within Russia, 
and has the most advanced human-capital stock.  Thus distance from Moscow is a potentially 
useful measure of regional isolation (we thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the use of 
this variable). 
 
3.   Results 
In quantifying the relationship between initial conditions, policy reform, new enterprise 
formation, and growth, special care was given to two issues: potential simultaneity between new 
enterprise formation and growth; and the potential impact of the three “outlier” regions on our 
analysis.  To deal with the latter issue, we conducted our analysis with and without the inclusion 
of these three regions.
3  As we illustrate below, the inclusion of these regions has a negligible 
impact on our results, so we report in full only those results obtained using the full data set.  We 
deal with potential simultaneity by using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure. 
                                                   
3 Note from Appendix Table A1 that Magadan is an outlier region for both LPRIV and SPRIV, 
which are roughly 4.67 and 5.5 standard deviations above average. We also examined the impact 
of dropping Magadan from the sample, and found that this had no impact on our results. 10 
 
We begin our analysis by regressing GROWTH on each of the additional variables 
included in our data set using ordinary least squares (OLS).  The resulting estimates are reported 
in Table 2.  (Standard errors reported throughout the paper are heteroskedasticity consistent, 
following White, 1980.)  The R
2 statistic we obtain in this regression is 0.502, indicating that our 
variables have reasonably high explanatory power in accounting for regional variations in 
growth.  Despite this, only two of the coefficients estimated in this regression are statistically 
significant at the 10% level: those associated with DEFENSE (with a p value of 0.03) and 
NEWENT (0.007).  Two additional variables have marginally significant coefficients: IO (p 
value of 0.156) and PRICE (p value of 0.142).  (A discussion of quantitative significance 
accompanies the presentation of our 2SLS estimates below.) 
We draw two preliminary conclusions from these OLS results.  First, with the exception 
of our price liberalization, industrial organization and defense measures, reform policies and 
initial conditions appear to exhibit little direct correspondence with subsequent growth.  Second, 
it appears that the remaining variables are potentially excludable from the growth regression in a 
2SLS framework.  Further support of this second conclusion is provided below. 
We next conduct a 2SLS analysis in which we obtain fitted values of NEWENT in a first-
stage regression, and then combine these fitted values with the variables IO, DEFENSE and 
PRICE in a second-stage growth regression.  The estimates we obtain are reported in Table 3.   
Consider first the NEWENT regression.  The R
2 statistic of 0.819 indicates that the 
variables we use as instruments provide a good characterization of NEWENT.  The coefficients 
on LNDIST, IO, DEFENSE, PRICE and SPRIV are statistically insignificant, but the remaining 
variables each appear to have a significant relationship with NEWENT, both statistically (at the 
5% level) and quantitatively.  To characterize quantitative significance, we report the impact on 11 
 
NEWENT of a one-standard-deviation increase in each variable in the last column of Table 3.  
For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in initial income (representing an 79% increase 
in the purchasing power of money income per capita, as reported in the sixth column of Table 3) 
corresponds with an additional 0.579 new enterprises per 1000 inhabitants on average across 
regions.  Corresponding figures for education, reformist voting and large-scale privatization are 
1.323, 0.826, and 0.443. 
Consider next the second-stage growth regression.  The R
2 statistic we obtain in this case 
is 0.491, thus we observe a trivial deterioration in fit relative to the OLS results reported in Table 
2.  Our measure of price liberalization remains marginally significant in this case, with a p value 
of 0.158.  However, the quantitative significance of this variable is substantial: a one-standard-
deviation increase corresponds with an additional annual growth rate of 0.671%.  The 
quantitative significance of IO and DEFENSE are also substantial (0.688% and 0.93%), and their 
coefficients are each statistically significant at the 10% level.  Finally, the coefficient estimated 
for the fitted value of NEWENT is 1.04, and has a corresponding t statistic of nearly 4.  In this 
case, a one-standard-deviation increase represents an additional 2.374 additional new enterprises 
per 1000 inhabitants on average across regions, and corresponds with an additional annual 
growth rate of 2.469%.   
Note that since the coefficient estimated for NEWENT in the second-stage growth 
regression is approximately 1, it is easy to calculate the indirect relationship between the 
variables used as instruments in the NEWENT regression and growth.  For example, a one-
standard-deviation increase in the large-scale privatization measure corresponds with an 
additional 0.443 new enterprises per 1000 inhabitants, which in turn corresponds with an 
additional annual growth rate of 1.04 x 0.443 = 0.46%.  Thus while there does not appear to be a 12 
 
direct relationship between large-scale privatization and growth, there does seem to be a 
significant indirect relationship, operating through the influence of large-scale privatization on 
new enterprise formation.  A similar observation holds for the reformist voting proxy. 
The 2SLS estimates reported in Table 3 are of course based on identifying restrictions; 
the restrictions involve the exclusion of LNDIST, INITIAL, EDU, REF, LPRIV, and SPRIV 
from the second-stage growth regression.  To evaluate the validity of these restrictions, we 
introduced each previously excluded variable – one at a time – in the second-stage regression, 
and then tested the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the newly included variable in the 
growth regression is zero using a simple t test.  Results of this exercise are reported in Table 4.  
Note that the null hypothesis is not rejected for any of the six variables used as instruments: the 
smallest p value we obtain is 0.478, for the reformist voting proxy.  The quantitative significance 
of this variable is non-trivial (a one-standard-deviation increase corresponds with an additional 
annual growth rate of 0.607%), but there is considerable imprecision associated with this 
estimate. A similar observation holds for the education measure (-0.586), while the quantitative 
significance of the remaining variables is negligible by comparison.  Thus there is reasonable 
empirical support for the identifying assumptions upon which the results of Table 3 are based. 
We conclude our analysis with an assessment of the influence of the “outlier” regions.  
This is done graphically in Figure 2, which illustrates the fitted relationship between new 
enterprise formation and growth derived using the 2SLS procedure described above for both the 
full data set (Figure 2a) and the subset obtained by excluding the three “outlier” regions (Figure 
2b).  Depicted values for new enterprise formation are the fitted values obtained from the first-
stage regressions, and depicted values for growth are residuals obtained by regressing growth on 
the variables besides new enterprise formation included in the second-stage growth regression.   13 
 
The results obtained using the full data set and the subsample are quite similar.  
Specifically, the coefficient estimated for NEWENT in the subsample is 1.414 (compared with 
1.04 in the full data set), and has a p value of 0.015.  Since the standard deviation of the fitted 
version of NEWENT is only 0.977 in the subsample (compared with 2.374 in the full sample), 
this estimate actually yields a reduced value of the quantitative significance measure (1.381%, 
compared with 2.469% in the full sample).  Nevertheless, the quantitative significance of new 
enterprise formation remains striking.  The quantitative significance of the policy variables is 
also similar in the subsample.  Specifically, one-standard-deviation increases in price 
liberalization, reformist voting and large-scale privatization correspond with additional annual 
growth rates of 0.46%, 0.75%, and 0.35%, compared with 0.671%, 0.884%, and 0.47% in the 
full sample.  
 
4.   Conclusion 
We have found that regional differences in the implementation of policy reforms help 
account in part for the striking regional variation in growth experiences observed in Post-Soviet 
Russia.  Specifically, price-liberalization reforms exhibit a direct positive relationship with 
growth, while the relationship between large-scale regional privatization activity (as well as 
patterns of reformist voting) and growth is indirect, with new enterprise formation serving as a 
critical link.   
We noted in the introduction that many cross-country studies have explored links 
between policy reform packages and growth in transition economies. The case of Russia suggests 
that generalizations based on aggregate observations should be interpreted with caution, given 14 
 
the extraordinary heterogeneity in policy reform packages and economic performance observed 
in Russia at the regional level. 15 
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Table 1: Growth and New Enterprise Formation 
 
Region Geographic  Territory  GROWTH  NEWENT 
Karelian Republic  Northern  -5.47%  4.59 
Murmansk Oblast    -6.10%  4.87 
St. Petersburg  Northwestern 1.48%  12.31 
Kaliningrad Oblast    -2.46%  4.08 
Novgorod  Oblast   0.91%  4.44 
Bryansk Oblast  Central   -9.02%  2.97 
Ivanovo  Oblast   0.37%  3.95 
Kaluga Oblast    -4.65%  5.74 
Kostroma Oblast    -5.23%  3.23 
Moscow   15.74%  16.61 
Oryol Oblast    -6.42%  2.52 
Ryazan Oblast    -7.12%  3.70 
Smolensk Oblast    0.60%  2.47 
Tula Oblast    -2.03%  3.47 
Yaroslavl Oblast    -2.02%  4.89 
Mariy-El Republic  Volga-Vyatka   -6.47%  2.09 
Mordovian Republic    -6.07%  1.88 
Chuvash Republic    -7.48%  3.09 
Kirov Oblast    -1.50%  1.96 
Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast    -2.67%  2.39 
Voronezh Oblast  Central Black-Earth  -2.82%  3.08 
Kursk Oblast    -5.51%  1.71 
Lipetsk Oblast    -4.70%  2.40 
Tatarstan Republic  Volga Region  -1.30%  4.23 
Astrakhan Oblast    -2.71%  4.18 
Volgograd  Oblast   2.66%  6.14 
Penza Oblast    -4.60%  3.91 
Samara Oblast    2.35%  4.74 
Saratov Oblast    -5.13%  3.80 
Ulyanovsk Oblast    -0.97%  2.54 
Adygey Republic  North Caucasus  -7.85%  4.00 
Kabardin-Balkar Republic    0.58%  4.05 
North Osetian Republic    2.28%  2.56 
Bashkortostan Republic  Urals  -0.96%  3.12 
Udmurt Republic    1.76%  3.72 
Kurgan Oblast    -5.02%  2.79 
Perm Oblast    3.80%  3.42 
Sverdlovsk     0.39%  5.08 
Chelyabinsk  Oblast   5.20%  3.09 
Novosibirsk  Oblast Western  Siberia  1.93%  5.20 
Omsk Oblast    0.87%  3.86 
Tomsk Oblast    -2.46%  4.17 
Tyumen Oblast    4.65%  9.40 
Buryat Republic  Eastern Siberia  -4.16%  3.89 
Primorskiy Kray  Far East  -2.25%  5.01 
Khabarovsk Kray    -7.12%  3.69 
Kamchatka Oblast    -0.99%  7.06 
Magadan  Oblast   1.95%  7.36 
Average   -1.79%  4.36 
Median   -2.14%  3.88 
Standard deviation    4.44%  2.63 
Minimum   -9.02%  1.71 
Maximum   15.74%  16.61 20 
 
Table 2: Growth Regression, OLS 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t statistic  p value 
Constant -10.844  5.542  -1.957  0.050 
Distance (log)  0.094  0.437  0.215  0.830 
Initial Income  0.226  0.630  0.360  0.719 
IO 0.046  0.033  1.419  0.156 
Defense 0.078  0.036  2.171  0.030 
Education -0.080  0.216  -0.373  0.709 
Reformist Voting  0.055  0.082  0.663  0.507 
Price Liberalization  2.548  1.737  1.467  0.142 
Large-Scale Privatization  -0.868  8.198  -0.106  0.916 
Small-Scale Privatization  -0.850  2.602  -0.327  0.744 
New Enterprise Formation  0.992  0.369  2.688  0.007 
R
2: 0.502         
 
Note: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980). 
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Table 3:  Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimates 
 
 
New-Enterprise Regression 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t statistic  p value 
Standard 
Deviation of 
Variable 
Quantitative 
Significance 
 
Constant  -4.378 1.780 -2.460 0.014 0.000 0.000 
Distance 
(log)  -0.136 0.162 -0.838 0.402 1.434 -0.195 
Initial  Income  0.733 0.341 2.148 0.032 0.790 0.579 
IO  -0.002 0.011 -0.174 0.862 14.439  -0.028 
Defense 0.002  0.012  0.194  0.846  12.982  0.030 
 
Education  0.312 0.053 5.927 0.000 4.243 1.323 
Reformist 
Voting 0.091 0.021 4.315 0.000 9.088 0.826 
Price 
Liberalization  0.473 0.639 0.740 0.459 0.292 0.138 
Large-Scale 
Privatization  5.431 2.691 2.018 0.044 0.082 0.443 
Small-Scale 
Privatization  -0.359 0.861 -0.417 0.676 0.241 -0.087 
R
2:  0.819        
 
 
 
Growth Regression 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t statistic  p value 
Standard 
Deviation of 
Variable 
Quantitative 
Significance 
 
Constant -9.532  1.446  -6.592 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
IO 0.048  0.029  1.652  0.099  14.439  0.688 
 
Defense  0.072 0.034 2.113  0.035  12.982  0.930 
Price 
Liberalization  2.301  1.631  1.411 0.158 0.292 0.671 
New Enterprise 
Formation 
(fitted)  1.040  0.261  3.981 0.000 2.374 2.469 
R
2:  0.491          
 
 
Notes: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980).  Quantitative significance 
denotes the impact on the dependent variable of a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
explanatory variable. 22 
 
 Table 4:  Exclusion Restrictions 
 
 
Full Sample 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t statistic  p value 
Standard 
Deviation of 
Variable 
Quantitative 
Significance 
Distance 
(log)  0.048 0.420 0.115 0.909 1.434 0.069 
Initial 
Income  0.232 0.632 0.367 0.714 0.790 0.183 
 
Education  -0.138 0.243 -0.567 0.571 4.243 -0.586 
Reformist 
Voting 0.067 0.094 0.709 0.478 9.088 0.607 
Large-Scale 
Privatization  -2.311 4.263 -0.542 0.588 0.082 -0.188 
Small-Scale 
Privatization  -0.622 1.400 -0.444 0.657 0.241 -0.150 
 
 
Notes: Exclusion restrictions were tested by dropping each of the indicated explanatory 
variables, one at a time, as an instrument for new enterprise formation, including the variable in 
the 2SLS growth regression, and testing the null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is 
zero.  Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980).  Quantitative significance 
denotes the impact on growth of a one-standard-deviation increase in the explanatory variable. 23 
 
Appendix Table A1: Regional Policy, Population Characteristics and Initial Conditions 
 
Region PRICE  LPRIV  SPRIV  REFORM  EDU  INITIAL  IO  DEFENSE  DIST 
  Oct-95 
ranking 
Dec-95 
firms per 1000 citizens 
Dec-95 
% 
1994 
% 
1993:IV 
 
1985 
% 
1985 
per 1000 
workers 
From 
Moscow 
(kms) 
Karelia  0.646  0.032  0.618  36.2 12.7 3.43 7.16  5.7  920 
Murmansk 0.438  0.051  0.261  38  15  3.79  -13.38  4.3  1951 
St.  Petersburg 0.500  0.140  0.038  54.1 29.5 2.65 7.50 34.4 646 
Kaliningrad 0.854  0.173  0.526  30.7  16.3  2.46  -28.05  15.9  1264 
Novgorod  0.771  0.126  0.556  30.5 11.5 2.51 7.30 39.2 602 
Bryansk  0.292  0.056  0.333  18.9 10.8 2.66 5.04  36  405 
Ivanovo 0.708  0.250  0.327  24.5  12.3  1.75  21.13  1.7  320 
Kaluga  0.167  0.155  0.383  28.5 14.6 2.74 1.60 46.9 183 
Kostroma  1.000  0.167  0.284  24.4 11.7 2.56 6.49 13.8 377 
Moscow  0.979  0.065  0.260  57.3 33.4 4.60 8.36 24.4  0 
Oryol  0.021  0.103  0.187  16.7 12.7 4.04 8.27  13  382 
Ryazan  0.792  0.157  0.299  20.3 12.6 2.43 6.03 27.6 197 
Smolensk  0.229  0.116  0.370  18.9 12.3 2.47 7.66 21.1 419 
Tula 0.688  0.115  0.294  26.4  13  3.06  12.08  33.3  193 
Yaroslavl 0.333  0.125  0.434  35.2  13.3  2.86  12.66  22.3  282 
Mariy-El 0.458  0.061  0.218  20.9  13  2.63  1.59  45.7  913 
Mordovia 0.146  0.029  0.117  28.2  13.4  2.00  11.54  15.8  601 
Chuvash 0.188  0.019  0.237  22.9  12  2.16  12.69  19.9  768 
Kirov  0.750  0.108  0.346  22.8 10.7 2.54 3.79 31.4 909 
Nizhni Nogorod  0.479  0.128  0.326  31.9  13  2.76  11.02  32.4  444 
Voponezh 0.313  0.077  0.243  21.3  14.2  2.39  -4.11  40.2  572 
Kursk  0.125  0.077  0.392  14.8 13.6 2.59 0.42 13.9 536 
Lipetsk 0.208  0.078  0.248  20.4  11.7  3.03  10.42  8.1  497 
Tatarstan 0.250  0.000  0.057  42.2  12.5  3.36  11.34  30.1  749 
Astrakhan 0.271  0.144  0.361  27.1  12.6  2.23  -19.56  23.1  1882 
Volgograd 0.083  0.151  0.295  27.4  13.8  2.32  10.01  20.9  1068 
Penza 0.542  0.026  0.232  19  11.9  2.12  5.11  24.4  707 
Samara 0.896  0.067  0.306  30.1  15.7  2.65  11.79  34.2  1044 
Saratov  0.833  0.135  0.444  21.7 16.4 2.57 6.47 32.3 859 
Ulyanovsk  0.042  0.054  0.083  16.3 12.1 3.90 8.28 34.2 873 
Adyegey 0.625  0.076  0.195  18.4  11.5  2.10  16.95  4  1653 
Karb.  Balkar  0.375  0.020  0.083  33.8 13.8 2.07 3.77 18.7 1866 
North  Ossetia 0.813  0.026  0.008  12.9 18.7 1.87 3.04 33.1 1916 
Bashkortostan 0.104 0.000 0.155 26.1  10.6  2.98 14.00 28.8  1493 
Udmurtia  0.396  0.032  0.301  23.9 12.6 2.31 7.25  57  1119 
Kurgan 0.917  0.088  0.209  19.2  9.2  1.89  0.83  22.4  2038 
Perm 0.938  0.046  0.399  34.5  11  2.32  11.96  37.8  1389 
Sverdlovsk 0.583  0.118  0.466  34.4  12.3  2.94  16.08  32.5  1647 
Chelyabinsk 0.604  0.096  0.363  34.6 12 2.22  21.79  22.3  1909 
Novosibirsk  0.521  0.148  0.199  26.6 15.9 1.55 0.91 45.3 3182 
Omsk  0.063  0.116  0.188  22.5 13.3 3.07 5.45 42.5 2550 
Tomsk 0.958  0.171  0.405  31  18.2  2.78  8.27  12.8  3489 
Tyumen 0.667  0.254  0.280  27.5  13.1  6.00  15.02  13.2  1983 
Buryatia 0.354  0.049  0.506  21  16.2  2.28  4.71  21.8  5494 
Primorskiy 0.729  0.033  0.367  21.4  16.4  1.63  -10.10  15.9  8896 
Khabarovsk  0.417  0.149  0.405  31.5 18.6 2.35 3.77 28.6 8087 
Kamchatka 0.875  0.104  0.630  40.1  16.7  3.24  -71.64  2.5  11436 
Magadan  0.563  0.487  1.656  31.3 16.4 3.38 0.62 41.4  11736 
           
Average  0.51  0.104  0.331  27.5 14.3 2.71 4.24 25.6 1926 
Median  0.51  0.100  0.300  26.5 13.0 2.56 7.20 24.4 917 
Standard  Dev. 0.29 0.082  0.241  9.1  4.2  0.79 14.44 13.0 2704 
Minimum 0.02  0.000  0.008  12.9  9.2  1.55  -71.64  1.7  0 
Maximum  1.00 0.487  1.656 57.3  33.4  6.00 21.79 57.0 11736 
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